Report: British military document criticizes US, UK post-war planning in Iraq

British and American officials did not adequately plan for the postwar situation in Iraq, according to excerpts of a British military report carried in a British newspaper.

The report, entitled "An Analysis of Operation Telic (the code name given to operations in Iraq)," said the U.S.-led coalition's mission in Iraq was hampered by poor planning and inadequate resources, and that British concerns were ignored by American commanders, according to The Sunday Telegraph.

"The evidence shows that too little planning was done for Operation Telic, particularly on the nonmilitary side, and that too few resources, both human and financial, were allocated to the postwar situation," the Telegraph quoted the report as saying.

The report, which the paper said had been drawn up late last year, said British efforts in Iraq were hampered by their status as junior partners in the coalition which invaded the country in March of 2003.

The British were committed to an ideologically driven U.S. timetable, one officer wrote, according to the paper.

"The train was on Grand Central station, and was leaving at a time which we did not control," the officer said.

In another apparent dig at the United States, the report said that while some coalition countries respected Britain's experience in the field of counterinsurgency, others "did not want to hear about Northern Ireland or colonial struggles."

The report also criticized British commanders, calling them "hopelessly optimistic" and saying the British had failed to capture the Iraqis' "hearts and minds."

Britain's Ministry of Defense declined to respond to the story, saying it did not comment on leaked documents.

Critics of the invasion of Iraq have argued that the U.S. did little to prepare for postwar situation there, relying on optimistic assumptions that the government would remain intact without Saddam's leadership and that no serious postwar insurgency would develop.

Official documents carried by the British press over the past few years have suggested that British officials had been concerned over the state of U.S. postwar planning.

A 2002 briefing paper given to Tony Blair and later leaked complained that U.S. military plans were "virtually silent" on the subject of the postwar occupation of Iraq.

Even more damaging charges were leveled by Retired Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, who led the British army during the invasion. In comments published earlier this year the general said U.S. postwar policy in the country had been "intellectually bankrupt."